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Abstract
We report experimental and theoretical results on the minority of three-game where three players
have to choose one of two alternatives independently and the most rewarding alternative is the one
chosen by a single player. This coordination game has many asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies
that are non strict and payo-asymmetric, and a unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in
which each player's behavior is based on the toss of a fair coin. We show that such a straightfor-
ward behavior is predicted by Harsanyi and Selten's (1988) equilibrium selection theory as well as
alternative solution concepts like impulse balance equilibrium and sampling equilibrium. Our results
indicate that participants rely on various decision rules, and that only a quarter of them decide
according to the toss of a fair coin. Reinforcement learning is the most successful decision rule as it
describes best the behavior of about a third of our participants.
Keywords: Coordination; Minority game; Mixed strategy; Learning models; Experiments.
JEL Classification: C72; C91; D83.
1 Introduction
Experimental paradigms like the Prisoners' Dilemma, Public Goods Games, the Dictator Game, the
Ultimatum Game or the Trust Game are game-theoretically trivial when players are selsh (and this
is known). They either require no strategic reasoning at all, or the anticipation of others' rationality.
Hence, game theory oers a clear-cut and testable prediction.1
However, many games have multiple (perfect) equilibria which may question an equilibrium as a
potentially satisfactory description of how a game will be played. One such class of games are market
entry games (Selten and G uth, 1982) which capture the typical coordination problem when a newly
emergent prot opportunity can be exploited only by a limited number of agents. In a market entry
game each player enters one of several markets. For at least one of the markets, the payo when
entering that market decreases in the number of entrants. Market entry games thus share two essential
characteristics: First, players have a common interest in selecting dierent actions, and, second, players
face the same set of choices and similar incentives. Due to their common interest in selecting dierent
actions, players would like to have some external clues to determine how dierent players should act
but, especially in the case of symmetry, the game does not oer any such clues when more than two
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1These paradigms have been subject to a very large number of experimental tests by both psychologists and economists
because the game-theoretical prediction ts poorly the experimental data (among others, see Ledyard, 1995 and Camerer,
2003, chapter 2 for surveys). Needless to say, evidence of mutual cooperation in the Prisoners' Dilemma, public goods
contribution, dictator allocation, ultimatum rejection, and trust repayment does not falsify game theory, per se. In
experiments, games are usually played in money. Consequently, the mentioned experimental paradigms are tests of a joint
hypothesis of game-theoretic behavior coupled with some assumption about utilities over money outcomes.
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them maximizing joint payos, and a unique inecient mixed strategy equilibrium. Market entry game
experiments have shown that behavior is consistent with reinforcement learning and that information
about others' choices shapes the behavioral adjustment over time (see Ochs, 1999 and Camerer, 2003,
chapter 7, section 3 for reviews).
In this paper, we present experimental evidence on the minority of three-game which diers in one
important dimension from the previously studied market entry games: All its asymmetric equilibria in
pure strategies are non strict and imply a payo-asymmetry between the two resulting parties. Conse-
quently, the unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium seems to be the natural benchmark to which
we can compare observed behavior. According to the unique symmetry invariant equilibrium of the
minority of three-game each player's behavior is based on the toss of a fair coin. Such a straightfor-
ward behavior is also predicted by alternative solution concepts like impulse balance equilibrium and
sampling equilibrium. Thus, deviations from the mixed strategy hypothesis results most likely from
heterogeneous decision rules.
Our experimental setup provides an adequate environment to identify such alternative decision rules.
First, we endow experimental subjects with a mixing device to directly elicit mixed strategies and to
allow subjects to generate i.i.d sequences of choices. Indeed, unlike in games with many interacting
parties where (population) shares of dierent strategies may be interpreted as a mixed population
strategy, triadic interaction is better studied by directly eliciting individual mixing. Of course, the
latter might result from strategic uncertainty, in the sense of ambiguous expectations, rather than from
indierence. Since we control for information retrieval, we hope to disentangle the hypotheses of strategic
uncertainty (to be correlated with more retrievals) and of indierence (previous choices of others render
both choices equally good). Second, we implement a strangers design which increases the diculty to
adapt to others' past play. Such changes may, of course, question the ndings of former experiments
employing market entry games like convergence to equilibrium play via reinforcement learning and the
eects of information feedback. In this sense, our study appears like a stress test of how robust the
former ndings are.
In Section 2 we provide a thorough theoretical analysis of the minority of three-game. Section 3
describes the experimental protocol and Section 4 presents the experimental results. Section 5 discusses
previous related research and Section 6 concludes.
2 Theory
In this section, we rst introduce the minority of three-game and we derive its standard game-theoretical
predictions. Second, we theoretically analyze the uniformly and an asymmetrically perturbed version of
the game, and we discuss the implications of Harsanyi and Selten's (1988) equilibrium selection theory.
Finally, we derive alternative predictions for the minority of three-game. Proofs can be found in the
appendix.
2.1 The minority of three-game
Three players have to choose one of two alternatives independently and the most rewarding alternative
is the one chosen by a single player. Hence, the two alternatives are perfectly symmetric and players'
payos are solely based on how players distribute between them. Formally, we denote the minority of
three-game by M3G = hN;(Ai)i2N;(ui)i2Ni where N = f1;2;3g is the set of players, Ai = fXi;Yig




1 if ai 6= aj and ai 6= ak
0 otherwise,
2
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of the minority of three-game is given by Table 1 where the rst (respectively the second and third)
element in a payo vector corresponds to player 1's payo (respectively player 2's payo and player 3's
payo). As usual, we denote by (Ai) the set of probability distributions over Ai and we refer to i 2
(Ai) as a mixed strategy of player i 2 N. The mixed extension of M3G is hN;((Ai))i2N ;(Ui)i2Ni
where Ui : i2N(Ai) ! R is such that Ui() =
P
a2A (i2Ni(ai))ui(a) for each  2 i2N(Ai).
Player 3
X3 Y3
Player 2 Player 2
X2 Y2 X2 Y2
Player X1 0, 0, 0 0, 1, 0 Player X1 0, 0, 1 1, 0, 0
1 Y1 1, 0, 0 0, 0, 1 1 Y1 0, 1, 0 0, 0, 0
Table 1: The minority of three-game.
There exists 6 pure strategy equilibria: (X1;Y2;X3), (X1;X2;Y3), (X1;Y2;Y3), (Y1;X2;X3), (Y1;Y2;X3),
and (Y1;X2;Y3). These pure strategy equilibria are Pareto ecient and non-strict since each of the two
players with 0-payo can deviate unilaterally without aecting her own payo. Actually, the best reply
structure of the game is rather simple since each player i 2 N should choose alternative Xi (resp. Yi),
if the sum of the probabilities for alternative X (resp. Y ) by her opponents is strictly lower than 1.
Indeed, for each player i 2 N, Ui (Xi; i) = j2Nj(Yj) > Ui (Yi; i) = j2Nj(Xj) is equivalent
to 1 >
P
j2N j(Xj) where i 6= j and  i 2 j2N(Aj). Moreover, a player is indierent between
alternative X and alternative Y whenever her opponents' probabilities for one of the two alternatives
sum to 1. This justies the (continuum of) equilibria where i(Xi) 2 [0;1] and j(Xj) = 1 k(Xk) = 1
with i;j;k 2 N and i 6= j 6= k. In such a case, player i 2 N can induce either one of the two pure
strategy equilibria. It also justies the completely mixed equilibrium with i(Xi) = 1=2 8i 2 N which
is the only symmetry invariant equilibrium of the minority of three-game. To summarize, the Nash
equilibria of the minority of three-game are (1=2;1=2;1=2) and all permutations of ((X);1;0) where
(X) 2 [0;1].
Interestingly enough, the standard game-theoretical predictions remain unchanged if one considers





1 if ai 6= aj and ai 6= ak
0 if ai = aj = ak
x otherwise,
with 0  x < 1.3 Indeed, the two games are identical when purely focusing on best-reply behavior.
Thus, as long as we rely on solution ideas which only depends on the best-reply structure of the game,
2The minority of three-game belongs to the class of win-loss games. For the sake of completeness, one can denote by 
the monetary payo associated with the less rewarding alternative, i.e., the one chosen by two or more players, and by  > 
the monetary payo associated with the most rewarding alternative, i.e., the one chosen by a single player. Obviously,
because each player can receive one of only two possible payos, there is no opportunity for choices by expected-utility
maximizers to be in
uenced by nonlinearities (risk preferences) in their utility functions. In particular, when players play
mixed strategies, all of the induced lotteries are binary lotteries.
3This payo structure is the one underlying a three players market entry game with two markets, each market having
a unitary capacity, and a payo function decreasing in a linear way.
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described in Table 1.
2.2 Equilibrium selection
In view of the theories of equilibrium selection, the minority of three-game is quite pathologic since it is
one of the rare applications where one encounters a minimal formation containing multiple equilibria (see
Harsanyi and Selten, 1988 and G uth and Kalkofen, 1989 for other applications of equilibrium selection
theory).
Lemma 1 The minority of three-game M3G has no proper subformation and is therefore a minimal
formation.
We now demonstrate that this pathology is fundamental in the sense that (i) it is noise persistent,
and (ii) asymmetries will not question its solution. The idea of \noise" is to solve the unperturbed
game as an idealisation. Asymmetry of \noise" appears to be realistic but is rather arbitrary from a
normative perspective.
If we neglect that pure strategy equilibria are represented by equilibria in extreme mixed strategies
(all freely disposable probability is put on one choice) the multiplicity of all equilibria applies also to
the "-uniformly perturbed minority of three-game with the restrictions i(Xi) 2 [";1   "] for i = 1;2;3
where " 2 (0;1=2) is supposed to be small.
Lemma 2 For all " 2 (0;1=2), the "-uniformly perturbed minority of three-game has no proper subfor-
mation and is therefore a minimal formation.
Instead of assuming uniform trembles, one can consider asymmetric trembles. More precisely, let us
introduce a minor asymmetry in the sense that no two players have the same minimal choice probabil-
ities, which we assume to be the same for both their pure strategies. Let " 2 (0;1=6) and assume for
the sake of specicity 1(X1) 2 [";1   "], 2(X2) 2 [2";1   2"], and 3(X3) 2 [3";1   3"]. We refer to
the extreme mixtures by "
i, which are X"
1 and Y "
1 for player 1, X2"
2 and Y 2"
2 for player 2, and X3"
3 and
Y 3"
3 for player 3. We can establish the following result
Lemma 3 The minority of three-game with the asymmetric trembles " for player 1, 2" for player 2
and 3" for player 3 where " 2 (0;1=6) has only two \pure strategy equilibria" (in the sense of using one
choice with maximal probability), namely (Y "
1 ;X2"
2 ;X3"




When trying to select a unique solution for the ("-uniformly perturbed) minority of three-game, the
fact that this game has no proper subformation becomes crucial. According to the theory of Harsanyi and
Selten (1988), one therefore has to apply the tracing procedure directly to the ("-uniformly perturbed)
minority of three-game to select a unique equilibrium. In view of the complete symmetry of the ("-
uniformly perturbed) minority of three-game as well as of the tracing procedure, this has to select
the completely mixed equilibrium according to which all three players use both choices with equal
probability. Thus, to avoid the only symmetry invariant solution of the unperturbed game it does not
suce to assume dierent trembles for dierent players.4
In the asymmetric (trembles) case, the two \pure strategy equilibria" qualify as primitive formations
since both equilibria are strict. Since neither of these two solution candidates can (payo or) risk
dominate the other, the theory of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) suggests to neglect them what essentially
means to apply the tracing procedure to the full minority of three-games with asymmetric trembles. The
degenerate nature of these games will imply that the linear tracing procedure yields no unique result
so that one has to apply its logarithmic version what hardly ever is needed in (economic) applications.
The symmetry of the two \pure strategy" equilibria (in the sense of using one choice with maximal
probability) as well as of the logarithmic tracing procedure implies that the solution for " ! 0 prescribes
4One might assume dierent trembles also for dierent choices what however appears even more arbitrary.
4
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sum of expected payos over all three players, implied by the solution, is less than that of any of its
pure strategy equilibria.5)
2.3 Alternative predictions
Below, we establish that the completely mixed equilibrium is also predicted by alternative solution
concepts which, arguably, rely on less stringent assumptions regarding the knowledge and understanding
of players.
Sampling equilibrium
Contrary to the common approach which is based on the dynamics of evolution and learning, Osborne
and Rubinstein (1998) have recently developed a static and equilibrium-based approach to the model-
ing of bounded rationality in games. Needless to say, this approach relies on less stringent assumptions
regarding the knowledge and understanding of players than does the standard theory of Nash equilib-
rium.6 Indeed, each player, rather than optimizing given a belief about the other players' behavior, rst
associates one consequence with each of her actions by sampling each of her actions K times, K 2 N,
and then she chooses the action that has the best consequence. In a symmetric game, a sampling(K)
equilibrium (S(K)-equilibrium) is a mixed strategy such that if all other players adopt this strategy
throughout the sampling procedure, then the probability that a given action is best under the sampling
procedure is precisely the probability with which it is chosen. One interpretation of sampling-equilibria
that is advanced by Osborne and Rubinstein is that it is the steady state of a dynamic process involving
a large population of individuals who are randomly matched to play the game. Each member of the
population adopts the same action throughout her stay in the population, and the population compo-
sition changes as a result of new entrants and departures. When entering, a player samples each action
K times and selects that which yields the best outcome according to the procedure described above. In
this case, an S(K)-equilibrium is a distribution of actions in the incumbent population which induces
the same distribution of actions in the 
ow of entrants.7
In the minority of three-game, if player i 2 N samples both available actions (Xi and Yi) K times,















Prob[u(Xi; i) = k]Prob[u(Yi; i) = k];
where in the case of realizations in which Xi is not unique in yielding the best outcome, the probability








































k (1   j(Xj)k(Xk))
K k :
As already mentioned, a sampling-equilibrium of a symmetric game corresponds to the steady state
of a dynamic process involving a large single population of individuals who are randomly matched
to play the game. An S(K)-equilibrium of the minority of three-game is a probability distribution
5Each player's expected payo at the symmetric equilibrium equals 1/4 which leads to an expected total payo of 3/4
for the three players.
6Actually, each player must know only her own set of actions.
7Sethi (2000) formalizes this dynamic process and uses the criterion of dynamic stability as an equilibrium renement.
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1   (X)2K k :
According to Osborne and Rubinstein's (1998) corollary [page 844], the equilibrium mixed strategy of
the minority of three-game is the unique limit of S(K)-equilibria as K ! 1. In fact, this equivalence
holds for every level of sampling, not only in the limit.
Lemma 4 For each K 2 N, the unique S(K)-equilibrium of the minority of three-game is given by
(1/2, 1/2, 1/2).
Impulse balance equilibrium
Impulse balance equilibrium is based on a simple principle of ex-post rationality. It applies to all games
in which players repeatedly decide on one parameter and in which the feedback environment allows
conclusions about what would have been the better choice in the last interaction.8 In the minority
of three-game, the parameter is the probability of choosing one of the two alternatives, which can be
adjusted upward or downward. Expected upward and downward impulses are equal for each of the
three players simultaneously in impulse balance equilibrium.
Lemma 5 The set of impulse balance equilibria is identical to the set of Nash equilibria of the minority
of three-game: it consists of (1=2;1=2;1=2) and all permutations of ((X);1;0) where (X) 2 [0;1].
3 Experimental design
The experiment consists of four sessions, with 27 subjects in each session, for a total of 108 subjects.
Subjects played 50 repetitions the minority of three-game, they were randomly rematched after each
play, and earnings, derived from the payo numbers in the previous section, were recorded in points
(the experimental currency).
In each repetition of the game, subjects were asked to give a probability distribution over the two
alternatives (X and Y ) instead of picking an alternative. A single random draw was made from this
distribution, and the realization became the subject's alternative. This mixed strategy device allows
subjects to generate random play through a probability experiment that they control and conduct on the
computer. Each subject had the option to ll an urn of 100 balls with any composition of alternatives
(balls) he or she desires. Once the urn was lled, the computer randomly selected one of the 100 balls
as the chosen alternative. However, opponents were only shown the chosen alternative (ball), not the
mixed strategy (i.e., the composition of the urn). This generation of a random outcome is in the spirit
of how mixed strategies are motivated in the classical treatments of game theory; namely, players choose
a probability distribution over the set of alternatives, and then draw a realization. The mixed strategy
device provides benets to both the experimenter and the subjects. First, this device allows subjects
to easily generate i.i.d. sequences of alternatives across stage games, or in other words, successfully
execute intended mixed strategies. Second, the device also provides the researcher with a new view of
how subjects may actually be playing the game.
In each repetition of the game, subjects had the possibility to collect some information about the
ve previous repetitions. Concretely, subjects had access to: (i) their choice and their earnings; (ii)
8Ockenfels and Selten (2005) show that the impulse equilibrium concept captures the experimental data of sealed-bid
rst-price auctions with private values.
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interacting opponents who chose alternative `Y'; (iii) the average earnings of their interacting opponents
who chose `X' and the average earnings of their interacting opponents who chose `Y'. These information-
gathering data illuminate the behavioral rules subjects are using and enable and indirect test of whether
they are best-replying (belief-based learning).
Practical procedures
The four sessions of the computerized experiment were conducted at the Experimental Laboratory of the
Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena (Germany). The experiment was programmed and conducted
with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were invited using an Online Recruitment System
(Greiner, 2004). All 108 subjects were undergraduate students from various disciplines at the University
of Jena, in each session the gender composition was approximately balanced, and no subject participated
in more than one session. Some subjects had participated in earlier economics experiments, but all were
inexperienced in the sense that they had never taken part in an earlier session of this type. Each session
lasted on average slightly less than 2 hours and the average earnings per subject were about 15 euros
(about $22), including a 2.50 euros show-up fee.9
At the beginning of each session subjects randomly drew a cubicle number. Once all subjects sat
down in their cubicles, instructions were distributed. Cubicles were visually isolated from each other and
communication between the subjects was strictly prohibited. Subjects rst read the instructions silently
and then listened as the monitor read them aloud (the monitor was a native German speaker). Questions
were answered privately. A short control questionnaire and two training repetitions followed.10 After all
subjects had answered correctly the control questionnaire, subjects played 50 repetitions of the minority
of three-game. Subjects were told that they would interact with randomly changing opponents. Actually
in each session there were three independent matching groups with nine participants. Subjects played
against randomly chosen opponents but only within their independent group. They were not informed
about the fact that there are three groups. We did not lie to them but conveyed the impression that they
interact with 26 other players. After each repetition of the minority of three-game, the computer screen
displayed the alternative chosen by each of the three players as well as the three earnings. Subjects
were not permitted to take notes of any kind about their playing experience. At the end of the 50
repetitions, subjects' payos were displayed on their screens and subjects privately retrieved their nal
earnings (including the show-up fee).
4 Results
In this section, we attempt at characterizing the decision rules used by participants. First, we provide
some aggregate statistics of our experimental data. At the aggregate level, players' behavior seems
based on the toss of a fair coin. Second, we investigate individual behavior. To do so, we introduce a
series of learning models and test the predictions of these models against our experimental data at the
individual level. Our individual-data analysis strongly indicates the existence of heterogeneous decision
rules among participants.
4.1 Aggregate statistics
Table 2 reports the matching group-level means and standard deviations in per repetition payos and
chosen number of X-balls. In a given repetition of the game, the number of X-balls chosen by the
9Points were converted to euros in the calculation of subjects' nal earnings at a conversion rate of 1 point to 1 euro.
10We took subjects through two training repetitions to familiarize them with the software, especially the mixed strategy
device. During the two trial repetitions, subjects were not able to choose freely the composition of the urn. Indeed, in trial
repetition 1 the urn had to consist of 99 `X' balls and 1 `Y' ball whereas in trial repetition 2 the urn had to consist of 1 `X'
ball and 99 `Y' balls. Subjects whose questionnaire results indicated that they had not suciently understood the rules of
the game were replaced and paid 5 euros for answering the questionnaire (35 subjects were invited for each session).
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with the predictions of the completely mixed equilibrium at the aggregate level.
Matching Payo Number of X-balls
group Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
1 0.258 0.438 49.042 31.081
2 0.256 0.437 49.769 33.050
3 0.247 0.432 52.900 37.387
4 0.229 0.421 48.049 32.430
5 0.242 0.429 47.958 40.439
6 0.253 0.435 49.573 36.756
7 0.269 0.444 49.613 41.347
8 0.251 0.434 48.776 36.404
9 0.264 0.441 53.271 38.950
10 0.255 0.437 44.042 37.381
11 0.260 0.439 47.380 42.629
12 0.260 0.439 50.198 33.481
Mean 0.254 0.435 49.214 36.778
Table 2: Payos and mixed strategies at the matching group level.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the changes of X-balls in successive repetitions. Five peaks are
worth noticing. The by far highest peak at 0 reveals that in more than 50 percent of the cases there is
no change towards the next repetition. The other peaks at -100 and 100 reveal that switches between
the pure strategies occur in slightly more than 10 percent of the cases. The peaks at -50 and 50 reveal
switches from the symmetric equilibrium to one of the pure strategies or vice-versa. Those switches
occur in less than 10 percent of the cases.
Finally, Figure 2 illustrates the temporal paths of X-balls choices for three dierent participants
in the rst matching group. Participant 4 chose in every repetition 50 X-balls whereas participant 9
alternated his/her choice of X-balls between 100 and 0. Participant 6 is an example of a player who
avoided the extrema. This illustration suggests the existence of heterogeneous decision rules which is
conrmed in our individual-data analysis below.
4.2 The learning models
Apart from the two varieties of learning which received the most scrutiny in experiments, belief learning
models and reinforcement learning models, we also consider learning models which formalize the dynamic
processes that might lead to the alternative equilibria of Section 2.
Belief-based learning
One widely used model of learning is the process of ctitious play (FP).11 In this process, players
behave as if they think they are facing a stationary, but unknown, distribution of opponents strategies.
Initially, each opponent's alternative is equally likely to be chosen. In each repetition, players choose a
pure strategy that is a best response to the belief formed from weighted average of immediate past and
the history before it, and they randomize when indierent. In repetition t + 1, the weight associated
with the immediate past equals 1=t.
11See Fudenberg and Levine (1998) for details.
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Figure 2: Temporal paths of X-balls choices.
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a pure strategy that is a best response to the belief formed from immediate past.
Reinforcement learning
An alternative, very elementary type of learning, is reinforcement learning (RL) which became recently
the subject of ongoing experimental research in economics (see, e.g., Erev and Roth, 1998). Players
associate with each alternative a propensity and the two propensities are set equal to one in the rst
repetition. After each repetition, actual payos are added to propensities (clearly, for a given player,
nothing is added to the propensity which corresponds to the alternative not chosen). Players choose an
alternative according to the mixed strategy given by the ratios of the two propensities to their sum.
Self-tuning experience weighted attraction learning
Camerer and Ho's (1999) experience-weighted attraction learning model is a hybrid model that en-
compasses several belief-based and reinforcement learning models as special cases. Unfortunately, this
learning model has many parameters which makes it dicult to compare with other (simpler) learning
models. We consider the one-parameter version of this learning model, named the self-tuning experience
weighted attraction learning model (STEWAL), and we refer the reader to Ho, Camerer, and Chong
(2007) for full details.
The response sensitivity is a parameter which needs to be calibrated before predictions can be
compared to individual behavior. We allow the response sensitivity to take any value in the interval
]0;1[.
Impulse balance learning
Impulse balance learning (IBL) relates to the concepts of impulse balance equilibrium and learning
direction theory (Selten, 1998). Like in reinforcement learning, players associate with each alternative a
propensity (initially, the two propensities are set equal to one) and alternatives are chosen according to
the mixed strategy given by the ratios of the two propensities to their sum. However, propensities are
updated dierently than in reinforcement learning. In particular, only the propensity of the non-chosen
alternative might be updated. Suppose that the alternative chosen by the player in a given repetition is
not the best reply to the pair of alternatives chosen by the opponents. Then the dierence between the
best-reply payo and the actual payo is added to the propensity of the non-chosen alternative. There
is no updating of propensities whenever the alternative chosen is the best reply.
Impulse matching learning
Impulse matching learning (IML) is identical to impulse balance learning except that the dierence
between the best-reply payo and the actual payo is always added to the propensity of the ex-post
optimal alternative.
Payo-sampling learning
Payo-sampling learning (PSL) relates to the concept of sampling equilibrium exposed in Section 2. In
each repetition, players rst draw one sample of earlier payos for each alternative where the samples are
randomly drawn with replacement. Second, the cumulated payos of each sample are computed and the
alternative with largest payos is chosen (if cumulated payos are identical, players randomize). Initially
and until positive payos for each alternative have been obtained at least once, players randomize.
The sample size is a parameter which needs to be calibrated before predictions can be compared to
individual behavior. We allow the sample size to take any value between 2 and 7.
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To assess the descriptive power of a given learning model LM, we compute for each subject i and in










between the predicted probability pLM
X (t) of the learning model and the ratio X-ballsi(t)=100 chosen by








and is a measure of the goodness of t for learning model LM and subject i. Mean deviation scores were
computed for each of the considered learning models as well as for the symmetric equilibrium strategy
(SES) where the player chooses each alternative with equal probability (X-balls = 50 8 t). In the
following, we compare the MDS with the early MDS (repetitions 1 to 17), the middle MDS (repetitions
18 to 34), and the late MDS (repetitions 35 to 50).
Figure 3 reports the mean deviations scores averaged over all 108 participants. For most learning
models as well as for the symmetric equilibrium strategy, minor dierences are observed between the
predictive power of early, middle and late play. Still, in the case of reinforcement learning, self-tuning
experience weighted attraction learning, impulse matching learning and the symmetric equilibrium
strategy, the predictive power clearly increases during the course of the session. We performed pairwise
comparisons of these scores with the help of two-tailed matched-pairs Wilcoxon signed rank tests. These
statistical comparisons, summarized in Table 3, conrm the existence of heterogeneous decision rules
among our participants. The three best learning models are self-tuning experience weighted attraction
learning, impulse matching learning and reinforcement learning and their predictive power is comparable
to the one achieved by the symmetric equilibrium strategy. Note that the mean deviation score of self-
tuning experience weighted attraction learning is minimized when the response sensitivity equals 0:32
whereas the mean deviation score of payo-sample learning is minimized when the sample size equals
2.
RL STEWAL SES IML IBL PSL FP
STEWAL n.s.
SES n.s. n.s.
IML n.s. n.s. n.s.
IBL < 0:05 < 0:10 < 0:10 n.s.
PSL < 0:01 < 0:01 < 0:01 < 0:01 < 0:01
FP < 0:01 < 0:01 < 0:01 < 0:01 < 0:01 < 0:01
Cournot < 0:01 < 0:01 < 0:01 < 0:01 < 0:01 < 0:01 n.s.
Table 3: P-values in favor of column models, two-tailed matched-pairs Wilcoxon signed rank test.
Next we classify participants' behavior over the 50 repetitions of a session. Reinforcement learning is
the most successful decision rule as it describes best the behavior of 29% of our participants. Almost as
successful are self-tuning experience weighted attraction learning and the symmetric equilibrium strat-
egy which describe best the behavior of 24% of our participants. Impulse matching learning describes
best the behavior of only 16% of our participants and none of the remaining decision rules describes
best the behavior of more than 5% of our participants.
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Figure 3: Mean deviation scores averaged over all 108 participants.
Our analyzes of the goodness of t indicate the existence of heterogeneous decision rules and the low
predictive power of belief learning models. The latter result is conrmed by the analysis of participants'
information retrieval. Participants mainly retrieved information concerning their own payo as well as
their opponents' payos in the previous repetition. Few information retrievals were made about earlier
repetitions than the previous one.
5 Related Literature
Though the minority game is related to market entry games, its equilibrium structure diers and favors
the completely mixed equilibrium as a natural benchmark. Thus, the numerous evidence gathered by
experimental economists on behavior in market entry games (e.g. Duy and Hopkins, 2005) might
not be transferable to minority games. Another related game is the route-choice game experimentally
studied by Selten, Chmura, Pitz, Kube, and Schreckenberg (2007). Again, the likelihood of observing
convergence to a pure strategy equilibrium is larger than in the minority game since pure strategy
equilibria induce the same payo for all players.
Few experimental studies have been conducted by economists on the minority game. Chmura and
Pitz (2006) report on two experimental treatments that dier in the amount of information given to
participants. The more information participants get, the more often they stick to their choice in the
next repetition. Chmura and Pitz (2010) compares the behavior of Chinese and German participants
and show that Chinese participants exhibit a stronger tendency to stick to their choice. Bottazzi
and Devetag (2007) investigates the extent to which stationary groups of ve participants are able
to coordinate eciently in a repeated minority game, and the impact of information on the resulting
eciency. Groups achieve a payo level equal or higher than the one associated with the completely
mixed equilibrium, and participants use public information as a coordination device. At the individual
level, little evidence of behavioral consistency with the completely mixed equilibrium is found, but
strong evidence of dynamic adaptation. Our experimental study conrms the nding that there is
considerable heterogeneity in participants' behavior. However, by implementing a strangers design and
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their \best shot". Our results are damaging evidence against the behavioral relevance of the symmetric
equilibrium strategy since participants' choices do not result from their inabilities to generate random
sequences of actions, and they are unlikely to be the result of repeated game strategies.
6 Conclusion
Market entry games are prototypical of coordination problems arising from a newly emergent prot
opportunity that can be exploited only by a limited number of individuals. Many experimental stud-
ies have been conducted in an eort to nd out which type of equilibrium participants are likely to
coordinate upon. However, none of these experimental studies has yielded evidence to suggest that
participants play equilibrium strategies. We pursue this line of research by conducting an experiment
on the minority of three-game. The latter game has many asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies that
are non strict and payo-asymmetric but a unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, in which each
player selects the two actions with equal probability. We show that such a straightforward behavior is
predicted by Harsanyi and Selten's (1988) equilibrium selection theory as well as alternative solution
concepts like impulse balance equilibrium and sampling equilibrium. The completely mixed equilibrium
seems therefore to be the natural benchmark to which we can compare participants' behavior. We
give the predictions of the completely mixed equilibrium their \best shot" by implementing a strangers
design and endowing participants with a mixing device, and we also oer participants the possibility to
collect some information about previous play.
Our results indicate that participants rely on various decision rules, and that only a quarter of them
decide according to the toss of a fair coin. Reinforcement learning is the most successful decision rule
as it describes best the behavior of about a third of our participants. Belief learning models have low
predictive success which is line with the fact that participants mainly collect information about past
payos.
In conclusion, heterogeneity in behavioral rules seems a persistent fact of games with many equilib-
rium outcomes, and this considerable heterogeneity in behavior does not result only from participants'
inability to generate random sequences of actions or from repeated game considerations.
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Proof of Lemma 1. A formation of M3G is a substructure F = (F1;F2;F3;u1 ()jF;u2 ()jF;u3 ()jF)
with ; 6= Fi  Ai for i = 1;2;3 and ui ()jF denoting the restriction of ui () to strategy vectors
a 2 j2NFj, which is closed with respect to best replies. Such a formation F of M3G is minimal when
there exists no proper subformation F0 of F.
If F is a proper substructure of M3G then there exists a player i 2 f1;2;3g with either Fi = fXig
or Fi = fYig. Without loss of generality, we assume that Fi = fXig. To show that such a substructure
is no formation, we simply distinguish the possible cases where we denote by j and k the two opponents
of player i.
 If jFjj = jFkj = 1, i.e., all three players have only one strategy, then the two possibilities are:
1. Fj and Fk contain the same choice (X or Y ): If Fi also contains the same choice then player
i's best reply is not contained in Fi. If Fi contains a dierent choice then both pure strategies
are best replies for player j and player k. In both cases, F does not qualify as a formation.
2. Fj and Fk contain dierent choices: Without loss of generality, we assume that Fi and Fj
contain the same choice. Clearly, both pure strategies are best replies for player i and player
j. F does not qualify as a formation.
 At least one of the two sets Fj or Fk contains two strategies where, without loss of generality, we
assume that this is Fj.
1. If Fi and Fk contain the same choice, player i will want to use his strategy, not contained in
Fi, when j uses the same choice as k. Thus, F is no formation.
2. If Fi and Fk contain dierent choices, for both of them their in F non-feasible action is a
best reply if j chooses the same alternative as the other (the choice in Fi, respectively Fk,
when considering player i, respectively k). Again, F cannot be closed with respect to best
replies.

Proof of Lemma 2. For a given " 2 (0;1=2), we denote by a"
i, ai 2 Ai = fXi;Yig, the extreme mixed
strategy with i(ai) = 1   " (i(bi) = " where bi 2 Ai = fXi;Yig and bi 6= ai). The normal-form












1 , ,  , ,  Player X"
1 , ,  , , 
1 Y "
1 , ,  , ,  1 Y "
1 , ,  , , 
Table 4: The "-uniformly perturbed minority of three-game in normal form.
where  = "(1 ") and  = (1 ")3 +"3. As (1 ")3 +"3  "(1 ") = (1 2")2 > 0, we can transform
this bimatrix by the positively ane utility transformation e ui() = (ui()   "(1   "))=((1   2")2) for
i = 1;2;3 to obtain the same bimatrix representation as for the non perturbed minority of three-game.
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Proof of Lemma 3. The payo structure of the minority of three-game with the considered asymmetric




















































































































































































= (1   ")(1   2")(1   3") + 6"3.
Straightforward computations show that the asymmetrically perturbed minority of three-game exhibits
















Proof of Lemma 4. As already mentioned, an S(K)-equilibrium of the minority of three-game is a
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2k1 ((X)(2   (X)))
K k1 = 1   (X)(2   (X))
K
























2k1 ((X)(2   (X)))










































2k1 ((X)(2   (X)))
K k1 (g((X);K)   h((X);K)):
Clearly, for a given K 2 N, ((X);(X);(X)) 2 [0;1]3 is an S(K)-equilibrium of the minority of
three-game if and only if (X) 2 [0;1] is a xed point of f((X);K) where f((X);K) is the right-
hand side of the above equality.
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xed point of f(;K). For K = 1,
one can easily check that f(1=2;1) = 1=2. Additionally, one can show that (details are available from
the authors upon request)










































































Assuming that, for each K 2 N, f(1=2;K) = 1=2 the above equality simplies to f(1=2;K +1) = 1=2.






















2k1 ((X)(2   (X)))
K k1 (g((X);K)   h((X);K)):
First, for each K 2 N, the second term of the function decreases on the interval [0;1] because: (i)
((X)(2   (X)))
K increases on the interval [0;1]; (ii) (X)2 clearly increases on the interval [0;1] which
implies that (1   (X)2)
K decreases on the interval [0;1] and therefore (1 (1   (X)2)
K) increases on
the interval [0;1].
Second, we show that the third term of the function also decreases on the interval [0;1]. Let ~ b1



















K k2 corresponds to P(~ b1  k + 1). When (X) (and therefore
(X)2) increases, the probability of success increases, so K independent trials lead to more suc-
cesses. Accordingly, for each k1 2 f1;:::;Kg, g((X);K)   h((X);K) decreases when (X) in-
creases. Let ~ b2 be a binomially distributed random variable whose probability distribution is given









K k1 corresponds to Pr(~ b2 = k1). When
(X) increases, (1   (X))
2 decreases, so Pr(~ b2 = k1) increases for small values of k1 and decreases for








K k1 (g((X);K)   h((X);K)) decreases when (X) increases
and thus the sum decreases.
To summarize, for each K 2 N, f((X);K) decreases on the interval [0;1] which implies that 1=2
is the only xed point of f((X);K) on the interval [0;1]. This completes the proof.

Proof of Lemma 5. Table 5 shows the impulses obtained to the alternative not chosen, similar to a
payo table.
Impulse balance equilibrium requires that player i's expected impulse from Xi to Yi is equal to his
expected impulse from Yi to Xi, i 2 N. This yields to the following impulse balance equation: Q
i2N i(Xi) =
Q
i2N (1   i(Xi)) which completes the proof.

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X3 Y3
Player 2 Player 2
X2 Y2 X2 Y2
Player X1 1, 1, 1 0, 0, 0 Player X1 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
1 Y1 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 1 Y1 0, 0, 0 1, 1, 1
Table 5: Impulses in the direction of the alternative not chosen.
19
Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 071